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AVOIDING TAX AVOIDANCE: A RATIONAL PROPOSAL TO CLOSE 
EXISTING LOOPHOLES IN THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM 
Davide Proietti∗ 
 
 
I like to pay taxes.  With them, I buy civilization. —Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Today, few people share Justice Holmes’ feelings about taxes.  April 
15 is a date when the feelings, needs, and desires of different citizens clash.  
It is a dreaded deadline for most taxpayers, especially those with a large 
taxable income (wealthy individuals and large corporations); other 
taxpayers wait at the edge of their seats for a refund; accountants rejoice as 
old and new clients knock at their doors to prepare the due filings; and the 
IRS oversees this frantic activity ensuring compliance with the law, proper 
reporting, and emanating an aura of holy terror.  However, there is one 
motive common to all taxpayers; whether in the form of maximizing a 
refund or minimizing a tax liability, everyone wants to keep as much money 
in his or her own pockets as the law permits.  But what exactly does the law 
permit? 
The Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) is long and complex, it contains 
many exemptions, exclusions, and exceptions, which are typically not 
within the understanding of the general public.  The “income defense 
industry,”1 a class of highly specialized lawyers and accountants, dispenses 
its knowledge on tax-minimization and tax-avoidance to the few chosen 
ones who can afford it, such as wealthy individuals and, most often, large 
corporations.  Why are corporations the most frequent clients of the income 
defense industry, and why is that a problem? 
Corporations in the United States are “persons” in the legal sense: 
entities that the law treats as individuals for purposes of doing business, 
assessing liability and, obviously, for tax purposes.2  Certain corporations 
 
∗ Davide Proietti, J.D. candidate May 2017, Florida International University College of Law. I would 
like to thank Prof. Gabilondo for his assistance in reviewing this comment. Additionally, a special thank 
you is due to the incredible people of the FIU LAW REVIEW. It is because of your passion and relentless 
efforts this law journal is the quality publication that it is. 
1  Jeffrey Winters, America’s Income Defense Industry, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2010, 6:21 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-winters/americas-income-defense-i_b_772723.html. 
2  See generally 14a C.J. Corporations § 2864 (1921) (describing the limitation of liability of 
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today reach titanic dimensions; hiring hundreds of thousands of employees, 
managing thousands of subsidiaries, and booking multi-billion dollar 
income statements.  The scale of operation of these corporate giants is 
exemplified by companies like Wal-Mart, which recorded sales of $476 
billion in 2014; and Exxon Mobil, whose sales were just shy of $400 
billion.3 Wal-Mart and Exxon Mobil’s tax expenses, as reported in their 
income statements, were approximately $8 billion for Wal-Mart, and $18 
billion for Exxon Mobil.4  These corporate behemoths have a tri-fold 
advantage in employing the services of the income defense industry.  First, 
they have the economic resources to access the best and brightest minds in 
the industry.  Second, they have the pressing need to reduce their gigantic 
tax liabilities.  Third, they have a world-wide presence that allows these 
large multinationals to exploit complex schemes of profit shifting, tax 
deferrals, transfer pricing, and other techniques described in more detail in 
later sections of this article. 
This explains why corporations have a particularly strong incentive to 
take advantage of the income defense industry; but why is that a problem?  
Is it not a legitimate interest of every citizen, whether a corporation or an 
individual, to reduce its tax burden within the limits of the law?5  Certainly; 
but, just like any other right, it should be punishable when abused.  The 
think tank Citizens for Tax Justice published a report in February 2014, 
which examined the tax reporting practices of the top tax-dodgers of 
corporate America.6  The report analyzed the 2008–12 period and showed 
that the average tax rate for 288 profitable, large, U.S. corporations was 
approximately 19.4% over the five years of the study.7  Further, twenty-six 
corporations, including giants like General Electric, Boeing, Verizon, and 
Yahoo!, paid no federal income tax for the period analyzed in the report.8 
It is objective and undeniable (even from a cursory reading of the 
statistics provided in the previous paragraph) that there are imperfections 
and contradictions in the I.R.C. that need to be addressed.9  This article 
 
corporate entities and their attributes of standing and “legal persona” separate from its owners and/or 
administrators). 
3  Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Annual Report (Form 10K) (Mar. 21, 2014); Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual 
Report (Form 10K) (Feb. 25, 2015). 
4  Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Annual Report (Form 10K) (Mar. 21, 2014); Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual 
Report (Form 10K) (Feb. 25, 2015). 
5  Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). 
6  See generally ROBERT S. MCINTYRE ET AL., THE SORRY STATE OF CORPORATE TAXES (2014), 
http://www.ctj.org/corporatetaxdodgers/sorrystateofcorptaxes.pdf. 
7  Id. at 3. 
8  Id. at 4. 
9  Specifically, this article will discuss 26 C.F.R. Sections 1.482, 1.83-7 (2016), and I.R.C. 
Section 83 (West 2016). 
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neither seeks to develop a utopian socialism, nor does it aim at impinging 
on the free market tradition of the United States.  The purpose of this article 
is to underline the intrinsic contradictions and inefficiencies of the I.R.C., 
particularly regarding those provisions that allow corporate entities to 
substantially reduce their effective tax rate to a rate comparable to small and 
middle enterprises. 
This article will further propose statutory language designed to close 
existing tax “loopholes” and to improve the equality of the tax system, thus 
improving the current state of affairs.  In the next section, this article will 
analyze why and how excessive corporate tax avoidance creates inequality 
throughout the tax system.  Then, this article will focus on the current state 
of affairs, discussing first the different tax statuses among business entities, 
and then the specific methods employed by corporations to reduce their 
income tax.  Lastly, this article will suggest proposed reforms to be applied 
to the existing tax provisions with the objective of mitigating or eliminating 
the unfairness described in the earlier paragraphs. 
 
WHAT IS FAIR AND WHAT IS NOT 
 
For most, the fact that multi-billion dollar corporations do not pay 
income taxes is startling and produces strong feelings of inequity and 
unfairness.  However, equity and fairness are more than just a general “gut” 
feeling; they comprise several dimensions.  Given the complexity of the tax 
system, it is almost an impossible task to properly balance all of the 
different layers of the multi-faceted idea of “fairness” in order to produce a 
perfect tax code. 
While an in-depth discussion on the ideals of fairness and justice is 
beyond the scope of this article, it is certainly important to mention that the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has identified seven 
different “dimensions” of equity and fairness with respect to tax policy, 
which provide a useful framework of analysis to determine when and how 
specific tax provisions affect the fairness of the overall tax system. 
1.? Exchange Equity and Fairness – Over the long run 
taxpayers receive appropriate value for the taxes they 
pay. 
2.? Process Equity and Fairness – Taxpayers have a voice 
in the tax system, are given due process, and are treated 
with respect by tax administrators. 
3.? Horizontal Equity and Fairness – Similarly situated 
taxpayers are taxed similarly. 
4.? Vertical Equity and Fairness – Taxes are based on the 
ability to pay. 
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5.? Time-Related Equity and Fairness – Taxes are not 
unduly distorted when income or wealth levels 
fluctuate over time. 
6.? Inter-Group Equity and Fairness – No group of 
taxpayers is favored to the detriment of another without 
good cause. 
7.? Compliance Equity and Fairness – All taxpayers pay 
what they owe on a timely basis.10 
Excessive tax avoidance is problematic because it hinders the fairness 
and administrability of the tax system at different levels. 
First, certain tax provisions encourage the movement of money 
towards less socially-desirable investments, thus creating a problem of 
exchange equity and fairness.11  The tax consequences of business decisions 
play an important role in the decision-making process itself, from both a 
management and investment perspective.  The tax implications of business 
decisions have created three major distortions in the U.S. economy: (1) a 
preference towards non-corporate business entities; (2) a preference towards 
debt financing of corporations and excessive leverage; and (3) a preference 
towards earnings retention, rather than distribution, to avoid the double 
taxation of corporate income.12  Further, the current nominal corporate tax 
rate in the United States, which is one of the highest among Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) countries,13 
creates an incentive to shift capital towards different, less tax-burdened 
investments, such as unproductive real estate14 and investment abroad.15 
Second, excessive tax avoidance creates differences among taxpayers 
with a similar taxable income but different access to professionals in the 
income defense industry, which is a problem of horizontal equity and 
fairness as well as inter-group equity and fairness.16  For example, let us 
 
10  AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (“AICPA”), GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
FOR TAX EQUITY AND FAIRNESS 3 (4th ed. 2007). 
11  Id. 
12  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: 
TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE vii (1992). 
13 Corporate Income Tax Rate, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://stats.oecd.org//In 
dex.aspx?QueryId=58204# (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
14  Real Estate Investment Trusts, for example, are not subject to corporate income tax, provided 
that they comply with certain ownership, operational, and distribution requirements.  I.R.C. § 857 (West 
2016). 
15  Countries like Bermuda, Jersey, the Isle of Man, the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, and the 
British Virgin Islands have a statutory 0% corporate income tax.  Kyle Pomerleau, Corporate Income 
Tax Rates Around the World, 2014, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 20, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/ 
corporate-income-tax-rates-around-world-2014. 
16  AICPA, supra note 10. 
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assume that two corporations have exactly the same income.  One 
corporation may end up with a larger tax bill than the other because it 
allocated more resources towards tax avoidance, electing to use more 
skilled tax attorneys and accountants. 
One may argue that this is not a problem at all, but rather the mere 
result of free will.  A corporation chooses a better accountant to reduce its 
tax liability like an individual may choose a better doctor to treat an illness.  
However, this argument is not entirely correct because not everybody may 
need to treat an illness every year, but every corporation does need to pay 
taxes every year.  The incidence of illnesses, which creates a market for 
doctors, is random; whereas the incidence of taxes is defined by law, and 
imposed by the government on the entity.  Because the government imposes 
a duty upon the taxpayers, the government also has the responsibility of 
ensuring the fairness of the tax reporting process of similarly-situated 
taxpayers. 
Third, excessive tax avoidance defeats the purpose of a progressive tax 
system––vertical equity17––because it concentrates the highest effective tax 
rates on the “middle” earners.  This concentration of the tax burden can be 
easily visualized by analyzing historical corporate tax return data.  The IRS 
periodically publishes statistical data summaries for the tax receipts of 
previous years.18  The year 2012 was analyzed to show how tax avoidance 
affects vertical equity.  The table selected for the analysis shows income tax 
receipts of corporations by size of taxable income.19  Using data from the 
table, the effective tax rate by taxable income was calculated, dividing the 
total income tax after credits, by the income subject to tax, for each of the 
taxable income brackets reported in the dataset.  The results are summarized 
in Table 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 Id. 
18 SOI Tax Stats - Corporation Data by Size, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/ 
SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation-Data-by-Size#_bm2# (last updated Jan. 6, 2015). 
19 SOI Tax Stats - Returns of Active Corporations, Other Than Forms 1120S, 1120-REIT, and 
1120-RIC, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Table-22-Returns-of-
Active-Corporations,-Other-Than-Forms-1120S,-1120-REIT,-and-1120-RIC (last updated May 25, 
2016). 
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From Table 1, it is easy to identify that the effective tax rate across the  
various classes of taxable income follows a shape closer to a bell curve, 
rather than an ideal positive-slope line.  The highest effective tax rate falls 
on corporations with a taxable income between $100,000 and $500,000.  
On the other hand, corporations with over $100 million in taxable income 
have a lower effective tax rate than corporations with $25,000 to $50,000 in 
taxable income. 
Lastly, from an administrative standpoint, excessive tax-avoidance 
creates inefficiencies within the tax system, both for the taxpayer and for 
the IRS, which is a problem of compliance equity and fairness.20  The 
taxpayer has an interest in allocating resources towards tax-avoidance, 
therefore reducing the amount of resources available for otherwise 
productive investments, while the IRS  collects less taxes than it should 
(because of the effective tax-dodging) and faces rising costs of enforcement 
due to the complexity of the regulations. 
 
CURRENT TAX SCHEME – BUSINESS ENTITIES 
 
As a general distinction, the I.R.C. recognizes three types of business 
entities, each subject to a different tax scheme: corporations, partnerships, 
and “disregarded” entities.21  These tax categories may or may not coincide 
with the actual organizational status of the entity; a corporation may be 
treated as a partnership for tax purposes, or vice versa, so it is convenient to 
compartmentalize the different “purposes” of the same entity because they 
may not necessarily overlap.  Disregarded entities, as the name suggests in 
a somewhat confusing manner, are not really entities.  In simpler terms, the 
existence of the entity for tax purposes is “disregarded” and the tax is 
applied directly to the owner.22  This generally applies to sole 
proprietorships where, also in terms of liability, formation, and financing, 
the existence of the entity is disregarded such that the owner and the entity 
are one and the same.23  Disregarded entities will not be further analyzed as 
their tax treatment falls beyond the scope of this article.  On the other hand, 
partnerships and corporations have a greater significance in terms of 
popularity, capitalization, and contradictory legislation. 
 
 
20  AICPA, supra note 10. 
21  26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a) (2016).  There are other entities with special tax treatment, such as 
non-profit corporations, trusts, foreign corporations, etc.  The analysis of these “special entities” is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
22  Id. 
23 Sole Proprietorship, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/sole-proprietorshi 
p-0 (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
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1. Partnerships 
 
Partnerships are possibly the oldest form of business entity recognized 
in history.24  As early as the 6th century, the laws of the Roman Empire 
started recognizing certain business, trade, and religious associations known 
as societas (literally “societies”), which had the ability to enter into 
contracts and assume liability independently from their owners.25  Under the 
common law, the legal concept of partnership, and the resulting joint and 
several liability of the partners, was developed as early as the 18th 
century.26  For tax purposes, partnerships are a type of “pass-through” 
entity, that is, the entity itself does not pay income tax, but the owners do at 
the individual level (so the tax “passes through” the entity to its owners).27  
So, while there is a separation between the legal entity and its owners in 
terms of contractual capacity and title to the assets, there is no such 
separation in terms of assessing tax liability.28 
 
2. Corporations 
 
Corporations, like partnerships, have a millenary history.29  The oldest 
known corporation was the Japanese temple construction company Kongo 
Gumi, which was incorporated in the year 578 and terminated its 
independent operations in 2006––an impressive record of 1,428 years in 
business.30  This clearly highlights one of the main differences between a 
corporation and a partnership; a corporation has an indefinite lifespan, 
whereas the life of a partnership is tied to the life of its owners, unless 
expressly provided otherwise in the partnership documents.31 
 
24  MAX WEBER, THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 120, (Lutz 
Kaelber trans., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003) (1889). 
25  HAROLD JOSEPH BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 215–16, (Harvard Univ. Press 1983) (1918). 
26  Waugh v. Carver, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 525 (C.P.). 
27  Partnerships, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-
&-Self-Employed/Partnerships (last updated Oct. 24, 2016).  Even though a tax is not assessed against 
the partnership itself, partnerships still have to report their income to the IRS using Form 1065.  The 
owners must then include their portion of the partnership income in their own personal tax returns. 
28  Id. 
29  James Olan Hutcheson, The End of a 1,400-Year-Old Business, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 16, 
2007, 7:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2007-04-16/the-end-of-a-1-400-year-old-
businessbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice. 
30  Id. 
31  As a default provision, a partnership terminates 90 days after one of the partners dies or 
decides to leave the partnership.  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801(2)(i) (1997).  However, partnership 
agreements generally contain specific provisions to avoid involuntary dissolution.  The partnership 
agreement governs over the default statutory rules.  “In the absence of prohibitory provisions of the 
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Another record holding corporation is the Dutch East India Company 
(chartered in 1602), recognized as the first multinational corporation, and 
the first corporate entity to ever issue stock to the public.32  This highlights 
another major feature of corporations––the ability to issue stock to the 
public to raise capital, which is not a feature of partnerships.  The third 
major difference between corporations and partnerships, and the last one 
relevant for this article,33 is the tax regime applied to each entity.  As 
previously discussed, partnerships are “pass-through” entities for tax 
purposes; corporations are not.  In terms of liability, contracting capacity, 
and tax purposes, a corporation “occupies the same position as a natural 
person sui juris.”34  This means that the income of a corporation is taxed 
first at the corporate level––the corporation files Form 1120 and pays its 
corporate income tax35––and then at the individual level, when the 
shareholders receive a dividend.36  Generally speaking, the three types of 
dividends are the ordinary dividend, qualified dividend, and capital gain 
distribution.37  The three dividends are taxed at different rates: an ordinary 
dividend is taxed at the receiving individual’s personal tax rate; a qualified 
dividend is taxed at either 0%, 15%, or 20%; and a capital gain distribution 
is taxed similarly to a qualified dividend.38  At the source, corporate income 
is taxed in brackets ranging from 15% to 35%.39 
 
3. A Hybrid Statutory Creation: LLCs 
 
Historically, the difference between partnerships and corporations 
makes sense.  A corporation provides a shield to liability for its owners 
who, in exchange for this liability protection, are subject to a double tax 
 
statutes or of rules of the common law relating to partnerships, or considerations of public policy, the 
partners . . . may include in the partnership articles any agreement they wish.” Lanier v. Bowdoin, 24 
N.E. 2d 732, 735 (1939). 
32  Clem Chambers, Who Needs Stock Exchanges?, MONDO VISIONE (July 14, 2006), http://www. 
mondovisione.com/exchanges/handbook-articles/who-needs-stock-exchanges/. 
33  The first full list of criteria that identifies an entity as a corporation is discussed in Morrissey 
v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).  Four criteria have been recognized as making a corporation 
different from other business forms, and will be hereinafter referred to as “corporate characteristics.” 
34  See 14a C.J. Corporations § 2864, supra note 2 (addressing the extent of capacity of a 
corporation) (citing Johnson v. Butte & Superior Copper Co., Ltd., 41 Mont. 158, 165 (1910). 
35  Corporations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-
&-Self-Employed/Corporations (last updated July 8, 2016). 
36  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Cat. No. 15093R, PUBLICATION 550: INVESTMENT INCOME AND 
EXPENSES 20 (2014). 
37  Id. 
38  Capital gains distributions have a separate tax schedule.  See id. at 70.  However, for purposes 
of this article, the tax schedule of capital gains distributions and qualified dividends overlap. 
39  I.R.C. § 11 (West 2016). 
09-DAVIDE 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17  8:30 PM 
234 FIU Law Review [Vol. 12:225 
regime.  In a very pragmatic way, the government charges a price for a 
service.  The “sovereign” collects a double tax in exchange for the grant of 
an indefinite life span, limited liability, and the possibility of raising capital 
on the public markets.40  Then, everything changed when Wyoming first 
started to recognize the Limited Liability Company (“LLC”) as a business 
form.41  During the 1970s, other states followed Wyoming’s steps by 
enacting limited liability statutes.  In 1988, Revenue Ruling 88-76 
determined that certain entities that met some, but not all, of the “corporate 
characteristics”42 would be treated as partnerships for tax purposes.43  LLCs 
were recognized as “pass-through” entities for tax purposes, but they also 
had limited liability by statute.44  With the objective of stopping the surge of 
tax cases crowding the federal courts after the enactment of the LLC state 
statutes, the IRS adopted the so-called “check-the-box” tax regulations in 
1997, affording taxpayers the ability to elect their preferred tax status.45  
LLCs enjoy the broadest choice because, by literally checking a box in 
Form 8832, an LLC could elect to be treated (for tax purposes) as either a 
pass-through entity (which is the default provision in case no election is 
made),46 or as a corporation taxed under either Subchapter C, or Subchapter 
S of the corporate tax code.47 
LLCs are interesting statutory creatures because they represent a 
change from the old dichotomist universe of partnerships vis-à-vis 
corporations.  LLCs are, essentially, corporations, except they cannot raise 
capital by issuing shares on the public market and they do not have to pay 
corporate taxes.48  This highlights the first controversy of the current 
corporate tax system. Does it make sense to have a corporate tax at all?  The 
assessment of a corporate tax may have been a tradeoff for a corporation to 
obtain several benefits over a partnership.  Today, most of these benefits are 
available without any tradeoff by forming an LLC.  In terms of a cost-
benefit analysis, corporate taxes appear to be the price corporations have to 
pay to sell shares on the public market––the only effective difference 
between today’s corporations and LLCs.  This idea is corroborated by the 
existence of another “hybrid” business form, the “S-Corporation.”49  The S-
 
40  Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). 
41  WYO.  STAT. ANN. § 17-15-101 et seq., repealed by 2010 Wyo. Sess. Laws 94. 
42  See Morrissey, 296 U.S. 344; see also Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976). 
43  Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. 
44  Id. 
45  I.R.C. § 7701 (West 2016). 
46  Id. 
47  I.R.C. § 1361 (West 2016). 
48  Rev. Rule 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 350. 
49 S-Corporations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-businesses 
-&-Self-Employed/S-Corporations (last updated Aug. 1, 2016).  Other restrictions apply, but they are 
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Corporation is a special statutory variant of a “traditional” corporation.  
Once formed, a corporation can, somewhat similarly to an LLC, “check the 
box” and elect to be taxed under Chapter I, Subchapter S of the I.R.C., 
instead of the default taxation under Subchapter C.50  S-Corporations are 
another type of pass-through entity, which, similarly to LLCs, have 
restrictions on share ownership.51  For example, S-Corporations cannot 
have more than one hundred shareholders,52 making it impossible to trade 
S-Corporations’ shares on a public stock exchange. 
For the small business owner, this is all nonsense.  John Doe, our 
sample small business owner, does not care whether his company is called 
“J.D.  Inc.,” “J.D.  LLC,” or “J.D. and partners.”  All John Doe cares about 
is, laconically, limited liability and having to pay the lowest amount of 
taxes possible.  A mom-and-pop shop owner has no short-term aspiration of 
getting a ticker symbol and starting to trade its shares on a stock exchange.  
So, the benefit of trading shares on a public market is reserved to larger 
corporations, those which meet the capital requirements to be listed on a 
stock exchange, but the double taxation of corporations affects all corporate 
entities, big or small, publicly traded or not.  This creates, in a way, a 
windfall to larger corporate entities because they are essentially the ones 
reaping the only remaining benefit of the corporate form.  But, do large 
corporations actually pay for this benefit?  The answer is “sometimes,” and 
this takes us to the next section of this article, tax avoidance. 
 
TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
This section will focus on the most well-known schemes employed by 
large multinational corporations to reduce their overall tax burden.  Not to 
be confused with underreporting or tax evasion, these practices are 
completely legal (except when they result in tax evasion) and they are 
herein exposed to highlight some additional contradictions created by the 
existing provisions of the I.R.C.  This section will address, in order, the 
practices of transfer pricing (with profit shifting to tax-havens) and stock 
option deductions. 
 
 
 
 
not relevant for the purposes of this article as they relate to the nationality of the shareholders, allowable 
business purpose, etc. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  Id. 
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TRANSFER PRICING – GOODS 
 
Transfer pricing, simply put, is the practice of altering the price of a 
good sold in a transaction between controlled subsidiaries to keep profits 
where the corporate income taxes are lowest.53  Transfer pricing is best 
described with an example.  CC Corp. (“CC”) is a United States-based 
manufacturer of cola drinks sold everywhere in the world.  CC buys its 
aluminum cans from one of its subsidiaries, A Inc., (“A”), which is 
incorporated in the Bahamas where there is no corporate tax.  The market 
price for an aluminum can is $1, and CC sells its cola cans on the market 
for $2.  Instead of purchasing the cans at the market price of $1, CC directs 
A to sell its cans above the market price, at $2 each.  CC keeps purchasing 
the overpriced cans, and it keeps selling its cola products at $2 each, thus 
making no profits at all.  On the other hand, A is capturing all the profits 
that would have been made by CC, which would have been subject to the 
35% corporate tax rate in the United States.  With this simple “trick,” CC is 
now making no profits at all from its United States activities.  All the profits 
are being kept in A, in the Bahamas, where they are not subject to any 
corporate tax. 
What is the economic impact of this type of tax avoidance?  The 
problem can be analyzed from three different perspectives.  First, CC is 
effectively avoiding corporate tax altogether, saving $0.35 for each can of 
cola sold during the tax year.  At the other end of the spectrum, the IRS is 
losing precious revenue, that is, those very same $0.35 per can.  Lastly, 
there is the perspective of subsidiary A.  Do these famous $0.35 per can at 
least go towards developing the economy of the Bahamas, expanding the 
local aluminum production industry, and creating jobs on the island?  No.  
In most cases, corporations like our subsidiary A are just empty “shells” 
consisting of only a name and a P.O.  Box without any real activity.  A does 
not produce anything, it just takes title to some aluminum cans bought on 
the market and sold to its parent company at an artificially inflated price. 
For obvious reasons, the I.R.C. prohibits the activities described in the 
example above.54  Transactions involving controlled entities must be 
reported to the IRS and are subject to strict supervision and reporting 
requirements.55  I.R.C. provisions require that the transactions between 
 
53  Transfer Price – Definition, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition 
/transfer-price.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
54  26 C.F.R. § 1.482 (2016). 
55  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Form 5471: Information Return of U.S. Persons with Respect 
to Certain Foreign Corporations (2016); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Form 5472: Information Return of 
a 25% Foreign-Owned U.S. Corporation or a Foreign Corporation Engaged in a U.S. Trade or Business 
(2016). 
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controlled entities be at arm’s-length, that is, the controlled entity must 
behave as if it was uncontrolled.56  Applying the rule to the example above, 
subsidiary A would have been forced to sell the aluminum cans at the going 
market price of $1 each, instead of the marked-up price of $2 each.  
However, real-world transactions are never so clear-cut, and this creates 
room for argument.  The I.R.C. recognizes that different transactions in 
different contexts may have different results, and therefore it introduces the 
so-called “standard of comparability.”57  The standard of comparability, and 
related provisions, can be summarized as follows: because no two 
transactions are identical, the reporting corporation should do its best to 
reproduce, in a transaction involving a controlled subsidiary, the context of 
a transaction involving an uncontrolled third party corporation.58 
There are various methods used to determine how an arm’s-length 
transaction between the two controlled entities would be structured.59  The 
I.R.C. requires that the “best method”––the one that better simulates an 
arm’s-length transaction––is employed for proper reporting.60  So, back to 
our example, executives from CC and subsidiary A will sit at the 
negotiation table and will start looking at various factors when determining 
the price A should charge to CC.  These factors include, for example, the 
price A charges to other companies for the same product, the economic 
conditions of the country where A is located, the volume of the trade 
between the two corporations, quality of the products, currency risk, etc.61 
After a thorough examination of all the relevant factors, the executives 
prepare an extensive report describing how A is selling special aluminum 
cans to CC, which are 100% recyclable and made only with high-quality 
aluminum coming from “responsible” mines where there is no exploitation 
of the workers.  To sweeten the deal, A will offer an extended 4-year 
warranty on the cans and, given the long-standing commercial relationship 
between the two firms, A will extend a credit line to CC at a mere 5% 
interest rate.  CC will purchase the aluminum cans from A, who will take 
care of the shipping, at an all-inclusive price of $1.80 per can; a true bargain 
given all the perks CC is getting with the deal.  With these added facts, CC 
buys the cans for $1.89 (the purchase price plus the interest on the credit 
line) from A, and sells the cola products for the same $2.00 each.  CC then 
 
56  26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(b) (2016). 
57  26 C.F.R. § 1.482(d)(1)–(2) (2016). 
58  Id. 
59  A full list of acceptable accounting methods can be found in DELOITTE, 2015 GLOBAL 
TRANSFER PRICING COUNTRY GUIDE (2015).  However, a discussion of the difference between the 
various methods is beyond the scope of this article. 
60  26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(c) (2016). 
61  See id. 
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reports the transaction to the IRS, files its taxes, and pays the 35% tax rate 
on its $0.11 of domestic profit.  CC then writes a check to the IRS for 
approximately $0.03 per can.  CC has respected all the current laws, and its 
management has effectively reduced the income tax expense of the 
corporation by 89%, from the initial $0.35 per can, to the current $0.03 per 
can. 
 
TRANSFER PRICING – INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
The concept of transfer pricing does not apply only to goods.  As a 
matter of fact, goods are fairly easy to price because they are tangible, can 
be classified, subjected to international standards for quality, etc.  Pricing 
becomes a lot more complex when the object of the trade is intellectual 
property (“I.P.”).  In many cases, corporations develop new products, which 
are then licensed for use to subsidiaries.  The accurate selection of corporate 
structure and licensing agreements between various tiers of subsidiaries can 
relieve multinational corporations of large amounts of tax liability. 
A typical example of an I.P. transfer pricing is the famous profit-
shifting scheme known as “double Irish with a Dutch sandwich,” pioneered 
by Apple, Inc., and soon followed by other technology and pharmaceutical 
corporations.62  This strategy is centered on the possibility of an Ireland-
incorporated entity to be taxed under a different country’s tax regime.63  
Irish law, in fact, determines the residency of a corporate entity based on 
where the corporation’s management is located.64 
Here is how it all works.  A U.S. corporation enters into a cost-sharing 
agreement with a wholly owned subsidiary in a tax-haven, such as 
Bermuda.  This tax-haven subsidiary is incorporated in Ireland, but is 
subject to Bermuda corporate tax because the main office and management 
of the corporation are in Bermuda.65  This corporation is the “First Irish.”  
The cost-sharing agreement provides that the U.S. corporation and the First 
Irish will split, 50-50, the development cost of a new technology and patent.  
The First Irish will retain the patent and license it for use to the U.S. 
corporation, this way the U.S.  corporation can recognize an initial tax 
saving by reducing its taxable income by its 50% contribution to the new 
 
62  Martin A. Sullivan, Apple Reports High Rate but Saves Billions on Taxes, TAX ANALYSTS, 
Feb. 13, 2012, at 777, http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/134tn0777.pdf. 
63  PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, Tax Facts 2015: The Essential Guide to Irish Tax (2015), 
http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/2015-pwc-ireland-tax-facts.pdf. 
64  [2.2.3] Company Residence in the State 4–5, IRISH TAX & CUSTOMS, http://www.revenue.ie/ 
en/about/foi/s16/income-tax-capital-gains-tax-corporation-tax/part-02/02-02-03.pdf (last updated July 
2015). 
65  Id. 
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technology, and by the amount of the royalties paid to the First Irish for the 
I.P. license.  This initial licensing agreement is regulated by the transfer 
pricing requirements of an arm’s-length transaction imposed by U.S. law.66 
Then, the First Irish sub-licenses the same I.P. received from the U.S. 
corporation to a wholly owned Dutch subsidiary.  Lastly, the Dutch 
subsidiary sub-sub-licenses the very same I.P. to a second Irish corporation, 
this time doing business in the EU (the “Second Irish”).  The Second Irish 
books all the sales of products and services outside of the United States.  
Then, the Second Irish pays a large royalty to the Dutch corporation for the 
I.P. it licensed, maintaining the profits in the Second Irish at a minimum, 
and, in any case, subject to the lower Irish tax rate of 12.5%.67  This first 
royalty is not subject to withholding tax,68 so the money flows untaxed from 
Ireland to the Netherlands.  The Dutch corporation then pays a large royalty 
to the First Irish in Bermuda, maintaining the profits of the Dutch 
corporation to a minimum and, in any case, subject to the lower Dutch tax 
rate of 25%.69  This second transfer is not subject to withholding tax either 
because of the many bilateral tax treaties signed by the Netherlands, of 
which Bermuda is a party.70  The corporation in Bermuda books the vast 
majority the profits and pays no corporate tax.  How does the money get 
back to the United States?  The corporation in Bermuda could transfer 
money back to the United States at any time by paying a dividend to its 
parent company, obviously subject to taxes for the repatriation of income.71 
Since this arrangement relies heavily on the use of I.P. and licensing 
agreements, it is mostly used by technology and pharmaceutical 
corporations, and the more unique and profitable the I.P. is, the larger the 
tax savings.72  It is estimated that the “double Irish with a Dutch sandwich” 
arrangement saved Apple between $2.4 and $4.8 billion on its tax bills in 
2011 alone.73 
 
66  See 14a C.J. Corporations § 2864, supra note 2. 
67  Corporation Tax, IRISH TAX AND CUSTOMS, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/ct/ (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2016). 
68  See Council Directive 03/49, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 157/49) (EC), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003L0049:en:HTML. 
69  PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, DOING BUSINESS IN THE NETHERLANDS (2014). 
70  For a complete list of the tax treaties of the Netherlands, see Overview of Treaty Countries, 
DUTCH TAX ADMINISTRATION, http://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontenten/belasting 
dienst/individuals/tax_arrangements/tax_treaties/overview_of_treaty_countries/. 
71  See I.R.C. § 884(a) (West 2016).  Branch profits tax, subjecting dividends from U.S. 
controlled foreign corporations to a 30% withholding tax. 
72  See Sullivan, supra note 62, at 777–78. 
73  Id.  Note that the Irish legislature has changed the provisions allowing this transfer pricing 
scheme with the enactment of the Finance Act 2014 (Act No. 26/2014) (Ir.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/26/pdfs/ukpga_20140026_en.pdf, which more strictly 
enforces taxation of Irish corporations and more narrowly defines the corporate residency requirements.  
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TRANSFER PRICING – CAPITAL, A/K/A “LIQUIDITY TRANSFER 
PRICING” 
 
Another interesting way to shape transfer pricing is the so-called 
“liquidity transfer pricing.”74  This technique is relied upon mostly by banks 
or financial institutions with large amounts of cash.75  Liquidity transfer 
pricing is not necessarily a tool for tax avoidance, but rather a system of 
adequate performance reporting.76  The importance of liquidity transfer 
pricing as a risk management tool was stressed by the Basel Committee on 
Bank Supervision with the introduction of the Basel III capital requirements 
in December 2010.77  While the regulatory and risk management aspects of 
liquidity transfer pricing are beyond the scope of this article,78 liquidity 
transfer pricing may also be another useful tool to lower the overall tax 
liability of large multinational corporations. 
The way liquidity transfer pricing works is similar to the other forms 
of transfer pricing, except that the “price” in this case is the interest charged 
on a loan.  Let us go back to the “double Irish with a Dutch sandwich” 
example above.  Our U.S. multinational corporation has effectively avoided 
the U.S. corporate income tax, but is now facing a difficult decision.  The 
corporation could repatriate the cash accumulated in Bermuda, and pay a 
hefty profit repatriation tax,79 which in some cases can be as high as 30% of 
the amount repatriated in the form of dividends.80  Alternatively, the 
corporation could keep the money in Bermuda, tax-free until repatriated, 
and enjoy the benefits of tax-deferral.81  Often, corporations prefer to 
accumulate cash in tax-havens, enjoying the benefits of tax-deferral 
 
However, all those entities incorporated before January 1, 2015, will have a “grace period” until 2020 
before they will be affected by the new provisions of the Finance Act 2014.  Based on the estimates in 
Dr. Sullivan’s article for the past fiscal performance of Apple, the U.S. multinational alone should be 
able to save another $10–20 billion before the new measures enter into force in 2020. 
74  Steve Culp, Liquidity Transfer Pricing is Now a Key Element in Banks’ Success, FORBES 
(Sept. 12, 2013, 3:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveculp/2013/09/12/liquidity-transfer-pricing-
is-now-a-key-element-in-banks-success/. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  See id; see also BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, LIQUIDITY TRANSFER PRICING: A 
GUIDE TO BETTER PRACTICE (2011), http://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers10.htm. 
78  For a proper account of the regulatory impact of Basel III regulations on liquidity and capital 
requirements, see generally José Gabilondo, Bank Funding: A Post-Crisis View (Oct. 22, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
79  See I.R.C. § 884(a) (West 2016). 
80  Id. 
81  David Alexander, Big U.S. Firms Hold $2.1 Trillion Overseas to Avoid Taxes: Study, 
REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2015, 6:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/06/us-usa-tax-offshore-
idUSKCN0S008U20151006#FqYgQUDfAc1X9Yzg.97 (describing how most Fortune 500 companies 
operate subsidiaries in tax-havens, and hold an approximate total of $2.1 trillion therein). 
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similarly to individuals with 401(k) plans.82  However, profits may need to 
be repatriated for a variety of reasons, ranging from capital needs, to 
downturns in the economy. 
In order to deal with these temporary cash shortages, the foreign 
subsidiary may use liquidity transfer pricing to avoid the profit repatriation 
tax. Instead of paying a dividend to its U.S. parent company, the subsidiary 
can offer it a loan.  Obviously, the loan will have to be structured as an 
arm’s-length transaction, in line with the going market rate, etc.83  This 
practice offers a threefold advantage. First, it avoids the profit repatriation 
tax.  Second, it gives the multinational yet another opportunity to shift 
profits towards the foreign subsidiary as the U.S. parent company makes 
payments of interest and principal on its loans.  Third, the interest paid by 
the parent company to the subsidiary is tax-deductible for U.S. tax 
purposes.84 
 
STOCK OPTION DEDUCTIONS 
 
The last tool for corporate tax avoidance discussed in this article is the 
deduction of stock options from taxable income.  Similar to accelerated 
depreciation, the stock option deduction is a tax “fiction,” that is, a 
deductible non-cash expense, which can be used to reduce the taxable 
corporate income.85  Executives and directors in larger corporations receive 
the majority of their remuneration through stock options,86 rather than in 
cash as a salary.  The stock option grants the holder a right to purchase a 
definite amount of the corporation’s stock, at a definite price (the issue 
price), independent of market fluctuations.87  Common practice for the 
recipient of the stock option is to exercise the purchase right only when the 
market value of the stock is higher than the issue price of the option, in 
order to immediately profit from the difference in prices.  This type of 
compensation is highly desirable for the executive and the corporation 
because of the substantial tax benefits it offers, as will be discussed in more 
 
82  Id. 
83  See 14a C.J. Corporations § 2864, supra note 2. 
84  I.R.C. § 163 (West 2016). 
85  I.R.C. § 162 (West 2016). 
86  There are two types of stock options: qualified and nonqualified.  The options referred to in 
this article–those issued as compensation to highly remunerated executives–are the nonqualified type, 
subject to the provisions of I.R.C. Section 83.  See generally JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL31458, EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS: TAX TREATMENT AND TAX ISSUES (2012) (discussing the 
current statutory scheme governing stock options, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of 
qualified and nonqualified stock options), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent/cgi?arti 
cle=1935&context=key_workplace. 
87  Id. 
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detail below. 
The transaction can be analyzed from both the perspective of the 
corporation and the perspective of the executive.  The executive receives 
the regular salary in cash, and a bonus stock option.  The issue price of the 
option does not have to be anywhere near the market price of the stock, it 
can be set arbitrarily, as long as the option cannot be actively traded.88  
While the executive pays income tax on the cash salary as it is earned, the 
stock option is not taxable until it is exercised, because its value cannot be 
“readily ascertained” until it is traded.89  The executive enjoys tax-deferral 
on the stock option until the day it is exercised.90 
From the corporation’s perspective, the deal is even sweeter.  First, the 
corporation provides an alternative form of compensation to its highest paid 
executives, therefore reducing what would otherwise be a direct cash 
outflow.  Second, the corporation can deduct the full exercise price of the 
option.91  While the deduction is used only in the year when the executive 
decides to exercise (so it may not produce an immediate tax benefit for the 
corporation), the amount of the deduction is substantial because these 
options represent the bulk of the employee compensation expenses for most 
corporations.  Third, when the option is exercised and the corporation books 
the deduction, there is still no cash outflow on the part of the corporation.  
The “expense” deducted is only an opportunity cost to the corporation, that 
is, what the corporation would have registered as a cash inflow if it had sold 
its stock to the market, instead of giving it as an option to the executive.92  
After understanding the mechanisms of the existing I.R.C. provisions with 
respect to transfer pricing and stock option deductions, the next section will 
focus on possible solutions to address the problem of excessive tax 
avoidance. 
 
A PROPOSAL 
 
Since the Tax Reform Act, signed in 1986 by former-president 
Reagan, multiple studies and proposals have been analyzed to determine a 
 
88  26 C.F.R. § 1.83-7(b)(2) (2016); Cramer v. Commissioner, 64 F. 3d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir. 
1995) (holding that a stock option that cannot be freely alienable does not have a “readily ascertainable 
fair market value.”).  Note that, as described in the sources, it is the option itself which cannot be freely 
traded rather than the stock of the corporation.  Therefore, a publicly traded company can issue a non-
transferrable traded stock option to one specific executive, and still be able to set the issue price of the 
option at will. 
89  I.R.C. § 83(e)(3) (West 2016) (exempting property of unascertainable value from the inclusion 
into the taxpayer’s gross income). 
90  Id. 
91  I.R.C. § 162 (West 2016). 
92  The effects of share dilution are assumed to be minimal. 
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relatively simple, administrable, fair, and effective tax system.93  Yet, no 
major tax reform has taken place in the last thirty years.94  Out of the 
different studies already performed by private and public entities, perhaps 
the most detailed and inclusive is the 1992 Report on Tax Integration 
redacted by the Department of the Treasury.95  The most important 
distinction between the Report on Tax Integration and other studies is that it 
analyzes tax reform not only from the perspective of the taxpayer, but also 
from the standpoint of the Government.96 
This different perspective adds a layer of complexity to the analysis of 
a proposed tax reform because, in addition to the ideals of equity and 
fairness in the tax system exposed in the earlier sections of this article, an 
effective tax reform must be easy to implement and grant an equal or 
increased revenue stream for the Government (tax-neutrality).97  While this 
article will focus only on the problems of transfer pricing and stock option 
deductions, rather than on the corporate tax system at large, the same 
principles of efficient and effective tax reform expressed in the Department 
of the Treasury’s Report on Tax Integration will be taken into 
consideration.  The next sections will analyze the problem of tax avoidance 
and propose a solution based on a model of international competitiveness. 
 
A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO TRANSFER PRICING TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
Transfer pricing is a complex problem to resolve because it does not 
derive from the tax code (and relative loopholes) of a single country, but 
rather it is the result of the existing gaps and discrepancies between the tax 
systems of different countries.  Although “[n]o consensus exists about the 
proper norms for capital taxation in economies with international capital 
and labor mobility,”98 the OECD has developed a set of actions to be taken 
by member countries in order to address the problem of transfer pricing on 
a global scale.99  The suggested solution of the OECD Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) Project, however, does not deviate substantially 
 
93  Andrew Lundeen, A Lot Has Changed in the 27 Years Since the Last Major Tax Reform, TAX 
FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/lot-has-changed-27-years-last-major-tax-reform; 
see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 12. 
94  Lundeen, supra note 93. 
95  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 12. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 75. 
99  OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHARING PROJECT: ACTION 13: GUIDANCE 
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY 
REPORTING (2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/beps-2015-final-reports.htm. 
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from what appears to be the present practice of corporate America.100  The 
OECD BEPS best practices would require large multinational corporations 
to maintain a three-tiered system of documentation in order to ensure that 
the principle of arm’s-length dealing is respected among the controlled 
subsidiaries of the Multi National Enterprise (“MNE”).101  However, just 
like it happens today under the IRS directives,102 it is possible to structure a 
transaction in a way that satisfies the requirements of the arm’s-length 
principle while still shifting a portion of the profits of the MNE to a low-tax 
jurisdiction.103  Although the more in-depth reporting required under the 
OECD BEPS guidelines will make transfer pricing more difficult, it will not 
solve the problem; a group of skilled accountants and lawyers can still 
manipulate the form of a transaction so as to maintain the substance of 
profit shifting.  Because added reporting requirements simply will not do, 
perhaps the most effective remedy to transfer pricing practices is the 
creation of an incentive not to engage in the practice; namely, reducing the 
statutory corporate tax rate.  This may seem to have been a long read for 
such an “easy fix,” but there is more to the matter than it seems. 
Transfer pricing is a technique to transfer profits from a high-tax 
jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction.104  A MNE acting as a rational 
decision-maker tries to maximize its utility, and engages in transfer pricing.  
Clearly, in a fictitious scenario where every country in the world had the 
exact same tax rate, transfer pricing would not provide any meaningful 
financial advantage because our rational decision-making entity would be 
indifferent between the available alternatives.  The reality is more complex, 
however, because the statutory tax rate by itself does not reflect the full 
extent of the “utility” derived from the choice of a tax jurisdiction over 
another.  Countries have widely different tax systems, reporting 
requirements and standards, penalties for underreporting, enforcement 
systems, etc.  All of these factors, together with the statutory tax rate, are 
taken into account by the rational decision-making MNE when determining 
the utility derived from the allocation of profits in one specific jurisdiction 
rather than another.  The bureaucracy associated with tax reporting and 
 
100  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 35, at 20. 
101  OECD guidelines essentially increase the reporting requirements to ensure that every 
transaction between controlled subsidiaries is at arm’s-length.  The proposed three-tier increased 
reporting requirement includes: “(i) a master file containing standardised information relevant for all 
MNE group members; (ii) a local file referring specifically to material transactions of the local taxpayer; 
and (iii) a Country-by-Country Report containing certain information relating to the global allocation of 
the MNE group’s income and taxes paid together with certain indicators of the location of economic 
activity within the MNE group.” OECD, supra note 99. 
102  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 35, at 20. 
103  See Transfer Pricing – Goods section above. 
104  Transfer Price – Definition, supra note 53. 
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compliance has a cost, and this cost is taken into account in determining the 
overall utility of shifting profits to a specific country. 
Further, the MNE needs to take into account the cost of tax-avoidance 
and potential non-compliance.  Stated differently, before shifting any profits 
around the world, the MNE will make sure that for every dollar spent on 
tax-avoidance (the bills of some professionals in the income defense 
industry can be very expensive), there is at least an equal or greater saving 
on the corporate tax bill, plus an allowance for any penalties in case the tax-
avoidance crosses the line of underreporting.105 
The decision of choosing which jurisdiction has the best tax regime is 
not an easy one as it requires the balancing of many disparate factors.  The 
mechanics of a similar decision-making process are interestingly modeled 
in a quantitative study conducted at the Leibniz Information Centre for 
Economics,106 which will help us understand the importance of the statutory 
tax rate in the context of the other factors.  The study aims at creating a 
dimensionless number–the Tax Attractiveness Index–which quantifies the 
desirability of a specific tax jurisdiction.107  For our purposes, the Tax 
Attractiveness Index can be equated to the utility received by the MNE 
when choosing a certain tax jurisdiction.  In the study, the U.S. tax system 
ranks among the countries with the lowest Tax Attractiveness Index.108  
One of the factors that most heavily influences such a low score is the 
negative effect of a very high statutory tax rate.109  What this study reveals, 
in simpler words, is that if a MNE was evaluating where to shift its profits, 
the United States would be at the bottom of the list.110  Further, the study 
finds that one of the main reasons for such a low score is the very high 
statutory tax rate in the United States.111  Therefore, a reduction of the 
statutory corporate tax rate alone may greatly increase the Tax 
Attractiveness Index of the United States, without the need for a complete 
restructuring of the corporate tax system. 
While a reduction of the corporate statutory tax rate alone will not 
completely resolve the problems of equity and fairness of the tax system at 
 
105  See Myles Udland, The IRS Says Coke Owes 3.3 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Sep. 18, 2015, 1:45 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/irs-coca-cola-tax-bill-2015-9 (describing how Coca-Cola is under 
investigation by the IRS for shifting profits abroad through transfer pricing.)  It is striking that Coca-
Cola seemed to be following reporting guidelines suggested by the IRS itself. 
106  SARA KELLER & DEBORAH SCHANZ, Measuring Tax Attractiveness Across Countries, THE 
OPEN ACCESS PUBLICATION SERVER OF THE ZBW – LEIBNIZ INFORMATION CENTR. FOR ECONOMICS 
(June 9, 2013) (manuscript), http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75220. 
107  Id. at 43, Table 1. 
108  Id. at 45, Table 3. 
109  Id. at 29. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
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large, a relatively small statutory modification may have a substantial 
impact in terms of reducing the existing inefficiencies of the current tax 
scheme.  First of all, a reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate will 
reduce the inequality between corporate and unincorporated entities.  
Currently, real estate investment trusts and certain limited liability entities 
in the oil drilling and exploration industry enjoy a tax advantage over 
publicly traded corporations as they are not subject to double taxation.112  A 
reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate will consequently reduce the 
bias towards non-corporate entities, therefore increasing inter-group equity 
and fairness, which was one of the problems described in Section I, Part A 
of this article.113  Similarly, a reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate 
will reduce the bias towards earning retention vis-à-vis dividend 
distribution precisely because of a reduced burden in the double taxation of 
corporate profits.  A lesser impact of the tax consequences in corporate 
decision-making processes will hopefully lead to less biased, and more 
efficient, decisions with a consequent improvement in corporate 
performance. 
A reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate will most likely translate 
into an immediate reduction of tax revenue for the government, creating a 
problem of tax-neutrality.114  However, the decrease in tax revenue, if any, 
will be only marginal.  The Tax Policy Center reports that in 2014 corporate 
tax receipts accounted for only 10.6% of the total receipts, compared to the 
46.2% of the personal income tax.115  Therefore, a reduction in the 
corporate tax rate will affect the total tax receipts much less than a proposed 
change to the personal income tax rate.  Further, although the literature on 
the matter is not conclusive, a 2011 study published in the INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE suggests that a weak, negative 
causality exists between corporate tax rate and per capita GDP growth.116  
The study does not provide us with a correlation indicator, which would be 
useful in determining how the changes in one variable (corporate tax rate) 
affect the other (per capita GDP growth).117  However, the study 
qualitatively concludes that a reduction in corporate tax rates will 
moderately stimulate GDP growth.118  For our purposes, this could 
 
112  See AICPA, supra note 10. 
113  Id. 
114  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 12, at 5. 
115  Historical Tables: Table 2.1 Receipts by Source: 1934–2020, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/hist02z1.xls (last visited Nov. 
2, 2016). 
116  Stella Karagianni et al., Tax Burden Distribution and GDP Growth: Non-linear Causality 
Considerations in the USA, 21 INT’L REV. OF ECON. & FIN. 186, 192 (2012). 
117  Id. 
118  Id. at 193. 
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potentially translate into an offset of the tax receipts reduction mentioned 
earlier in this paragraph.  However, more precise quantitative studies need 
to be conducted on the matter before the problem of tax-neutrality can be 
considered resolved. 
One last aspect of tax neutrality needs to be considered under this 
model.  The increase in the overall competitiveness of the U.S. business 
environment will likely stimulate investment in the country.  As discussed 
in earlier sections, the Tax Attractiveness of the United States is among the 
lowest in the study mainly because of the high statutory corporate tax 
rate.119  Nonetheless, the United States houses a vast majority of the largest 
and most profitable corporations in the world.120  This is because, 
notwithstanding its high corporate tax rates, the United States offers a 
fertile land for businesses, with relatively limited regulations on 
entrepreneurs and start-up businesses; an efficient justice system, which 
enforces the protection of property and the collection of debts; multiple 
large stock exchanges and securities markets; and a relatively efficient and 
transparent administration of the government.121  While all of these benefits 
to businesses attract investments, high taxation discourages them, reducing 
the competitiveness of the system as a whole on the international 
investment market.122  In terms of transfer pricing, as mentioned earlier, this 
creates an incentive to shift profits abroad.  However, as the tax differential 
with other countries is reduced, this “incentive” to shift money abroad is 
also reduced, up to a point of equilibrium, where the push to move money 
out of the country is nonexistent.  By setting a corporate tax rate just below 
this “equilibrium” point, there would be a small incentive for MNEs to 
move or maintain profits inside of the United States rather than outside.  
Unfortunately, again, an exact quantitative measure of what this new, lower 
tax rate should be is extremely difficult to estimate with precision.123 
 
A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO STOCK OPTION DEDUCTIONS TAX 
AVOIDANCE 
 
The problem of non-statutory stock options lies in the wording of one 
provision of the I.R.C. and its related Section in the C.F.R., I.R.C. Section 
83(h) and C.F.R. Section 1.83-7(a)–(b).  These sections provide for the 
 
119  See KELLER & SCHANZ, supra note 106. 
120  See generally Fortune 500, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/fortune500/ (last visited Nov. 2, 
2016) (providing general background information on the largest 500 corporations in the world). 
121  See Ease of Doing Business in the United States, WORLD BANK DOING BUSINESS PROJECT, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/united-states (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
122  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 12, at 4. 
123  Karagianni et al., supra note 116. 
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taxation of nonqualified (or non-statutory) stock options, and for the 
standard used to determine whether the option has a readily ascertainable 
market value.124  As explained earlier in the paragraph, these types of 
options allow both the receiving executive and the issuing corporation to 
realize substantial savings in tax liability.  The taxable income is recognized 
by the individual when the option is exercised,125 while at the same time the 
corporation books a deductible non-cash expense.126 
In order to provide a solution to the tax avoidance problem presented 
by stock option deductions, it is necessary to identify how stock options 
should be taxed and how to assess the tax liability.  To determine how to 
tax stock options, we perform an analysis of the transaction under the 
“business purpose” and “substance over form” doctrines.  To determine 
how to assess the tax liability, we will propose an amendment to the 
statutory language in the relevant Sections of the I.R.C. 
 
1. How to Tax Stock Options 
 
A non-statutory stock option is a form of compensation, just like a 
salary.127  The I.R.C. considers certain stock option plans (qualified stock 
options) as compensation, and those stock options are subject to 
withholding taxes like FICA (Federal Insurance Contributions Act) and 
FUTA (Federal Unemployment Tax Act), which are calculated based on the 
cash value of the stock compensation under the plan.128  Nonqualified stock 
options should be no different, and should therefore be taxed as regular cash 
salary.  The U.S. tax administration and courts recognize the legal doctrines 
of “substance over form” and “business purpose.”129  Both doctrines derive 
from the Supreme Court ruling in Gregory v. Helvering, a case decided in 
1935.130  These same doctrines should be applied when analyzing the issue 
of stock option deductions. 
Seven years before the case was decided by the Supreme Court, 
petitioner Evelyn Gregory was the sole stockholder of United Mortgage 
Corporation (“United”), which, in turn, owned stock of another corporation, 
 
124  26 C.F.R. § 1.83-7(a)–(b) (2016). 
125  I.R.C. § 83(b) (West 2016). 
126  I.R.C. § 83(h) (West 2016). 
127  See Janet Novack, Stock Options Meant Big Tax Savings for Apple and JPMorgan, as Well as 
Facebook., FORBES (Apr. 24, 2013, 12:12 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jaetnovack/2013/04/24/stoc 
k-options-meant-big-tax-savings-for-apple-and-jp-morgan-as-well-as-facebook/#82f9fd225036. 
128  I.R.C. § 3121(a)(22)(A) (West 2016) (FICA applied to certain stock compensation plans); 
I.R.C. § 3301 (West 2016) (assessing FUTA tax on all “wages,” as defined in I.R.C. § 3306(b)(19)(A) 
(West 2016), to include the cash value of certain stock compensation plans). 
129  Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468 (1935). 
130  Id. 
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Monitor Securities Corporation (“Monitor”).131  Gregory intended to 
transfer the Monitor shares owned by United to herself, without having to 
pay taxes on the distribution.132  Gregory devised the following strategy to 
dodge her tax bill. First, she incorporated a new company in Delaware, 
called Averill Corporation (“Averill”), of which she was the sole 
shareholder.  Three days later, she transferred all of the Monitor shares to 
Averill in a transaction that complied with the tax exemption requirements 
of a reorganization under Section 112(g) of the Revenue Act of 1928.  
Lastly, she dissolved Averill and distributed the Monitor shares, the only 
asset owned by Averill, to herself.133 
Helvering, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, sued Gregory on 
the basis that the transaction had no purpose other than tax avoidance.134  
However, the Board of Tax Appeals rejected the Commissioner’s view 
because the transaction fell squarely within the boundaries of the law at the 
time.135  The Commissioner appealed to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which reversed the lower court, and certified the question to the 
Supreme Court.136  The Supreme Court decision is a milestone in tax law; 
however, it is somewhat controversial. 
The opinion stated, in one of the opening paragraphs, that “[t]he legal 
right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his 
taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be 
doubted.”137  The Court cited relevant authority, and the opinion should 
have stopped there, reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals and upholding 
the right of a taxpayer to minimize its tax burden.  After all, what Gregory 
did was perfectly legal, as held by the Court itself. 
However, the opinion did not stop there and went beyond the plain 
language of the law, although unambiguous, creating two doctrines of 
judicial invention: the business purpose doctrine, which states that if a 
transaction has no other business purpose but to reduce the amount of taxes 
payable, the transaction will be disregarded; and the substance over form 
doctrine, which states that the underlying substance of a transaction, and not 
its form, should be taken into account when determining tax liability.138 
The case set forth language, which suggested a bright line test to 
 
131  Id. at 467. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. 
135  Gregory, 293 U.S. at 468. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. at 469. 
138  Id. at 469–70. 
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determine whether the business purpose doctrine applies.139  The Court 
stated, in relevant part, that a transaction should be disregarded if it has “no 
business or corporate purpose;” but the transaction is in fact “a mere 
device.”140  This implies that a transaction with any corporate or business 
purpose should not be disregarded.  However, a corporation never has the 
sole purpose of tax avoidance.  Most corporations are created with the 
purpose, as stated in their bylaws, of conducting “any and all lawful 
business.”  Even Averill, the “device” corporation created by Gregory, 
performed lawful business until it was closed, as recognized by the Court.141  
Therefore, the test set out by the Court is less of a bright-line rule than the 
language in the opinion seemed to suggest.  Rather, the test conforms more 
closely to a balancing test, where the Court will disregard a transaction if its 
purpose of tax avoidance greatly outweighs any other business purpose. 
Although controversial, and maybe even a bit contradictory, Gregory 
v. Helvering is still good law.  We therefore proceed with the analysis of 
stock option deductions under the business purpose doctrine and the 
substance over form doctrine.  Under the business purpose doctrine, we 
look at whether there is any other underlying business purpose to the 
transaction and, therefore, whether it should be disregarded.142  The 
arguments that can be made as to the business purpose of stock options are 
(1) stock option compensation increases employee performance because the 
employees are now shareholders as well, thus having a direct monetary 
reward from the positive performance of the corporation; and (2) stock 
options are a form of non-cash compensation, which alleviates the 
corporation of large cash outflows for payroll. 
Both arguments can be easily defeated by the existence of statutory (or 
qualified) stock options distributed under an incentive plan.  Unlike 
nonqualified stock options, qualified stock options cannot be exercised 
before one year from vesting and have a minimum exercise price, thus 
reducing excessive speculation and tying compensation even more closely 
to performance and employee retention than any nonqualified stock 
option.143  Therefore, issuing nonqualified stock options serves no real 
business purpose that could not otherwise be equally or better served by a 
different type of taxable compensation.  The business purpose of 
nonqualified stock options should therefore be disregarded.  Conversely, if 
a business purpose for these options exists, other than mere tax avoidance, 
then such business purpose has a negligible extent when compared to the 
 
139  Id. at 468. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. 
143  I.R.C. § 422 (West 2016). 
09-DAVIDE 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17  8:30 PM 
2016] Avoiding Tax Avoidance 251 
tax avoidance benefits provided by the nonqualified stock option 
compensation. 
The analysis of stock options under the substance over form doctrine is 
simpler.  The substance over form doctrine is applied particularly to cases 
where the transacting entities are closely related.144  In this case, the highly 
compensated executives have a very strong connection with the entity 
issuing their stock options, although indirectly.  Generally, a compensation 
committee is employed in determining executive pay.  The committee is 
composed of, at least in part, corporate insiders.  Therefore, the 
compensation committee has a close relationship to the corporation, since 
corporate employees are on the committee.  Further, the compensation 
committee also has a close relationship to the executives whose pay it is 
assessing because those executives have the authority to fire the insiders on 
the committee.  Stock option compensation, as the name suggests, is 
compensation.  As previously stated, stock options are subject to FICA and 
FUTA, and they become part of the ordinary income of the taxpayer when 
they are exercised, just like any other form of compensation.  Therefore, 
stock options should be treated as any other compensation and taxed when 
earned. 
 
2. How to Assess Tax Liability 
 
The problem with taxing stock options like a salary is that, unlike a 
salary, the value of the option cannot always be readily ascertained.145  
Specific provisions in the C.F.R. detail that, unless the option is actively 
traded, it is difficult to ascertain the value of the option and, therefore, the 
tax owed.146  The option has a value beyond the difference between the 
exercise price and the market value of the underlying asset.  The option’s 
value must also include a premium for the right of the holder to exercise the 
option when it is preferred.147  The reason nonqualified stock options have a 
special tax regime is because they do not have a readily ascertainable 
 
144  “The substance-over-form doctrine is invoked by the government with greatest success with 
respect to transactions between related persons, since, in these circumstances, form often has minimal, if 
any, nontax consequences and particular forms are often chosen solely to reduce taxes.”  BORIS I. 
BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS: ¶ 4.3 
PERVASIVE JUDICIAL DOCTRINES 9 (2016). 
145  26 C.F.R. § 1.83-7 (2016). 
146  26 C.F.R. § 1.83-7(b)(2) (2016) sets out a presumption, whereas, if the stock option is not 
actively traded on a public market, its value is determined to be “not readily ascertainable.”  If the 
taxpayer wished to rebut the presumption, instead of taking advantage of this statutorily granted tax-
deferral tool, he would have to prove that the option meets the four criteria described in the statute. 
147  26 C.F.R. § 1.83-7(b)(3) (2016). 
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market value.148 
However, a possible solution to the problem would be making an 
estimated tax payment when the option is issued.  The estimated tax 
payment would be based on the market price minus the exercise price.  
When the option is actually exercised the taxpayer can make an adjustment 
to his tax: (1) if the spread between exercise price and market price has 
increased, the taxpayer will make an additional tax payment; and (2) if the 
spread between exercise price and market price has lowered since the date 
of issue of the option, the taxpayer will receive a refund.  This system 
would eliminate the benefit of tax deferral to the individual because the 
income from the option is taxed as the option is issued. 
In order to obtain this result, relevant language in the C.F.R. must be 
amended.  The relevant C.F.R. sections are lengthy and therefore not 
reported in this article, which will include only the proposed amendments, 
with modifications to the original language in bold and a comment. 
 
Proposed Amendment to 26 C.F.R. Section 1.83-7(a) and (b). 
 
(a) In general.  If there is granted to an employee or 
independent contractor (or beneficiary thereof) in 
connection with the performance of services, an option to 
which section 421 (relating generally to certain qualified 
and other options) does not apply, section 83(a) shall apply 
to such grant if the option has a readily ascertainable fair 
market value (determined in accordance with paragraph (b) 
of this section) at the time the option is granted.  [If the 
option does not have a readily ascertainable market 
value at the time the option is granted, the person who 
performed such services realizes compensation in the 
year the option is granted in the amount equal to the 
value of the option (determined in accordance with 
paragraph (b) of this section)].  If section 83(a) does not 
apply to the grant of such an option because the option does 
not have a readily ascertainable fair market value at the 
time of grant, sections 83(a) and 83(b) shall apply at the 
time the option is exercised or otherwise disposed of, even 
though the fair market value of such option may have 
become readily ascertainable before such time.  If the 
option is exercised, sections 83(a) and 83(b) apply to the 
transfer of property pursuant to such exercise, and the 
 
148  26 C.F.R. § 1.83-7 (2016). 
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employee or independent contractor realizes compensation 
upon such transfer at the time and in the amount 
determined under section 83(a) or 83(b).  If the option is 
sold or otherwise disposed of in an arm’s-length 
transaction, sections 83(a) and 83(b) apply to the transfer of 
money or other property received in the same manner as 
sections 83(a) and 83(b) would have applied to the transfer 
of property pursuant to an exercise of the option.  The 
preceding sentence does not apply to a sale or other 
disposition of the option to a person related to the service 
provider that occurs on or after July 2, 2003. For this 
purpose, a person is related to the service provider if— 
 
(1) The person and the service provider bear a 
relationship to each other that is specified in section 
267(b) or 707(b)(1), subject to the modifications that 
the language “20 percent” is used instead of “50 
percent” each place it appears in sections 267(b) and 
707(b)(1), and section 267(c)(4) is applied as if the 
family of an individual includes the spouse of any 
member of the family; or 
 
(2) The person and the service provider are engaged in 
trades or businesses under common control (within the 
meaning of section 52(a) and (b)); provided that a 
person is not related to the service provider if the 
person is the service recipient with respect to the option 
or the grantor of the option. 
 
[If the person who performed services realizes a 
gain (or loss) from the exercise, sale, or disposal of 
the option, and such gain (or loss) has not been 
accounted for in the year the option was granted, 
then such gain (or loss) shall become part of the 
person’s income in the year the gain (or loss) is 
realized.] 
 
(b) Value of the option 
(1) Actively traded on an established market.  Options 
have a value at the time they are granted, but that value 
is ordinarily not readily ascertainable unless the option 
is actively traded on an established market.  If an 
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option is actively traded on an established market, the 
fair market value of such option is readily ascertainable 
for purposes of this section by applying the rules of 
valuation set forth in § 20.2031-2. 
(2) Not actively traded on an established market.  
When an option is not actively traded on an established 
market, its fair market value for purposes of this 
section shall be equal to the excess of 
(i) the fair market value of the asset underlying 
the option, over 
(ii) the exercise price of the option. 
The value of the asset underlying the option 
shall be ascertained for purposes of this section 
by applying the rules of valuation set forth in § 
20.2031-2. 
(3) Option Privilege.  [. . .] Repealed.149 
 
Comment to Proposed Amendment to 26 C.F.R. Section 1.83-7(a) and 
(b). 
 
This proposed amendment to 26 C.F.R. Section 1.83-7(a) and (b) 
introduces the proposed taxation methodology to reduce the impact of tax 
deferral on stock option compensation.  The new language in subsection (a) 
provides a definite scenario for the cases in which the option does not have 
a readily ascertainable market value; the very same scenario that created the 
problem of tax-deferral in the original statute.  The proposed amendment 
provides explicitly that in such cases the person receiving the option in lieu 
of cash compensation has to include the value of the option in its taxable 
income for that year. 
The proposed new language in this section imposes a duty on the 
taxpayer to report the income derived from the stock option immediately, 
regardless of whether the option is exercised.  This measure imposes a 
rather burdensome requirement on the taxpayer, who has to make a tax 
payment on unearned income in the majority of cases where the stock 
option is not exercised in the same year it is granted; if the option was, in 
fact, exercised when granted, there would be no tax-deferral benefit.  
Although burdensome, this measure is necessary to eliminate the tax saving 
derived from deferral of taxation on stock options, which is substantial at 
the highest income brackets.  Further, it is an established practice of 
 
149  Id. 
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corporate-America to highly inflate the equity portion in executive 
compensation packages, leaving the immediately taxable cash portion to a 
minimum.150  The proposed amendment, which introduces an immediate tax 
liability for the option-holder, will likely have the collateral benefit of 
discouraging excess equity compensation. 
The last sentence in amended subsection (a) provides for the 
adjustment in the year of exercise or disposal of the option.  This language 
is a catch-all safety net, which provides for any other possible scenario in 
which the option-holder disposes of the option, realizing either a gain or a 
loss.  Although it is still possible to obtain a tax-deferral benefit in case the 
value of the asset underlying the option increases in value over time, such 
effect is reduced from the tax deferral resulting from the previous version of 
the statute. 
Subsection (b) has undergone more substantial changes.  The 
subsection heading has been changed to “value of the option” to mirror the 
language in amended subsection (a).  The language of (b)(1) is substantially 
the same, as it does not affect stock options granted to individual 
executives.  These options, as discussed in the relevant sections above, have 
certain restrictions on alienability and cannot be publicly traded on an 
established market. 
The language of (b)(2) is radically different.  The proposed language 
now provides an explicit valuation formula in the cases where the option is 
not publicly traded.  The proposed valuation is simply the difference 
between exercise price and the value of the asset underlying the option. In 
the case at bar, one share of stock of the corporation, which is granting the 
option.  This formula presents another problem, however, which is the 
determination of the value of the asset underlying the option.  The problem 
is solved by the immediately subsequent sentence providing for valuation in 
accordance with 26 C.F.R. Section 20.2031-2. 
26 C.F.R. Section 20.2031-2 could potentially be applied to two 
different scenarios.  First, a scenario where the option is not traded on an 
established market, but the underlying asset is.  Second, a scenario where 
neither the option nor the underlying asset are traded on an established 
market.  If the option is not traded on an established market, but the 
underlying asset is, the valuation of the option with the proposed formula is 
 
150  From a cursory review of the literature and quantitative data on the matter, it appears that the 
CEO’s of large U.S. corporations have a compensation package that highly favors equity compensation.  
Data extrapolated from S.E.C. filings reveal the equity-to-cash ratio for these executives can be 
anywhere from 2:1 to almost 50:1.  See generally Browse Executive Salaries, Bonuses, Stock Grants, 
Stock Options and Other Compensation, SALARY.COM, http://www.salary.com/Executive-Salaries/ (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2016) (analyzing data from selected S.E.C. filings to graphically represent the 
compensation breakdown of executives of large publicly traded corporations).  The corporations 
selected by the author were Oracle, Wal-Mart, and Bank of America. 
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extremely simple.  The fair market price of the underlying asset is given by 
the average of the highest and lowest selling price on the valuation date,151 
and the exercise price of the option is determined by the option contract 
itself.  This scenario is by far the most common because, generally, only 
larger corporations issue stock options.  The corporate entities with the need 
of employing complex compensation arrangements involving stock options 
usually meet the capitalization threshold required to be publicly listed on an 
established market.  However, smaller corporations, not publicly listed, may 
issue stock options; which takes us to the second scenario where neither the 
option nor the underlying asset are publicly traded. 
In this case, 26 C.F.R. Section 20.2031-2 provides a series of 
acceptable calculation methods, which can be used to estimate the value of 
the asset in question.  If bid and ask prices for the underlying stock are not 
available, the calculation will be based on a series of factors, which include 
the net worth of the corporation, its predicted earning power, dividend-
paying capacity, and other factors, such as market outlook, etc.152  It will 
appear to the reader, at first glance, that these calculation techniques are not 
exact, but rather aim at providing a best-guess estimate of the value of the 
stock.  The valuation of a company that is not publicly traded is part science 
and part dogmatic mystery, even for the connoisseurs.153  Nonetheless, the 
value of the proposed amendment lies in its inverse proportionality between 
error and transaction size. 
When a corporation begins its activities, it is hardest to value it 
because there is no historical data to base the predictions on.  However, a 
corporation in its infancy is the least likely to grant stock options to its 
executives.  Even in the extremely unlikely case in which a stock option 
was granted at this early stage, and the calculations of value of the 
underlying asset were far from its real value, the overall size of the 
transaction would probably be negligible.  In sum, even if the formula 
provides for approximate results in small-business type transactions, the 
error in valuation would have only a minimal impact on the taxpayer.  This 
is because of at least two factors. First, the value of the option is likely to be 
small.  Second, the executives of such a small business are more likely to be 
in lower tax brackets, thus reducing the effect of tax deferral offered by the 
 
151  26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2(b)(1) (2016). 
152  26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2(f) (2016). 
153  The problem of valuation of not-yet publicly traded corporations is well-known even to large 
financial conglomerates.  As a vivid example of this problem, Facebook’s stock valuation was off by 
almost 30% when compared to the market’s actual perception of the value of the stock.  Corporate 
banking giant Morgan Stanley was behind the valuation, and, despite its history and expertise on the 
matter, it made a multi-billion-dollar mistake in valuation.  David Weidner, Facebook IPO, Facts, 
Fiction, and Flops, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2012, 7:29 PM), http://wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023 
04821304577436873952633672. 
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stock option.  As the corporation grows, so does the historic data on which 
the value predictions can be made.  As the likelihood of granting stock 
options increases, their value increases, and so does the potential for tax 
deferral.  However, the precision of calculation of the value of the 
underlying asset also increases, making the model more reliable.  As the 
potential for tax deferral increases, so does the robustness of this valuation 
model. 
 
Proposed Amendment to I.R.C. Section 83(h). 
 
(h) Deduction by employer. In the case of a transfer of 
property to which this section applies or a cancellation of a 
restriction described in subsection (d), there shall be 
allowed as a deduction under section 162, to the person for 
whom were performed the services in connection with 
which such property was transferred, an amount equal to 
the amount included under subsection (a), (b), or (d)(2) in 
the gross income of the person who performed such 
services. Such deduction shall be allowed for the taxable 
year of such person in which or with which ends the 
taxable year in which such amount is included in the gross 
income of the person who performed such services. 
 
[In the case of a transfer of property governed by 26 
C.F.R. § 1.83-7, the employer granting the option shall 
be allowed a deduction under § 162 in the year when the 
option is exercised, sold, or disposed of, by the recipient 
of the option. Such deduction under § 162 shall be equal 
to the total income realized by the recipient of the 
option with the exercise, sale, or disposal thereof.]154 
 
Comment to Proposed Amendment to I.R.C. § 83 (h). 
 
The proposed amendment to Section 83 seeks to modify the existing 
language of the statute to better reflect the changes proposed in the earlier 
sections.  The aim of this amendment is to allow the employer of the 
recipient of the stock option to make appropriate business expense 
deductions; both in the year when the option is granted, as well as in the 
year when the option is exercised by the employee. 
 
154  I.R.C. § 83(h) (West 2016). 
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However, this proposed amendment does not fix one of the main 
problems of stock option deductions; the fact that the corporate entity gets 
to make a business deduction for a non-cash expense.  As mentioned in the 
earlier sections of the article, this is a sort of a “freebie” to the corporation, 
which deducts as a business expense something that is not really an 
expense, but rather only an opportunity cost.  However, the deduction of 
non-cash items is an issue that is somewhat accepted in accounting with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  Another common example of a 
non-cash expense that can be deducted under current tax law is 
depreciation.155  The I.R.C. even provides for accelerated depreciation 
schedules, which allow the taxpayer to effectively defer income tax.156  
Interestingly enough, the depreciation schedule provided for by the I.R.C. 
are so fictional, and so clearly geared towards tax avoidance, that in most 
cases they have absolutely no reference to the actual useful life of the 
assets.  For example, long-lived assets like heavy-duty oil drilling 
equipment, or airplanes, have a book life of five years.157  But, a discussion 
of non-cash deductions is beyond the scope of this article, and it will not be 
addressed here. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The I.R.C. is an incredibly complex body of law, and the discussion of 
any tax issue or reform, even if successful, is just a drop in the ocean.  
However, the ocean is made of little drops of water, and tax reform needs to 
start somewhere.  This article discusses two of the problems affecting 
corporate taxation in the United States, with a particular focus on excessive 
corporate tax avoidance. 
Corporate tax avoidance is unfair and inequitable under multiple points 
of view.  First, excessive tax avoidance affects the quality of the 
investments; “poisons” the corporate decision-making process; and biases 
corporate decisions towards tax-exempt investments, investments abroad, 
earnings retention, and excessive debt levels.  Second, excessive tax 
avoidance creates differences between similarly-situated taxpayers with 
different access to the income defense industry.  Third, because tax 
avoidance is more effective as the size of the enterprise increases, it defeats 
the purpose of a progressive tax system by leaving most of the tax burden 
on the “middle” earners.  Lastly, excessive tax avoidance directly reduces 
the effectiveness of the tax system, and of the economy at large, because 
 
155  I.R.C. § 168 (West 2016). 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
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more resources are allocated towards tax avoidance, and the authorities 
have a high cost of enforcement to ensure compliance with overly complex 
regulations. 
The article focused on corporations, and on the most common 
practices of tax-avoidance employed by corporate giants like Apple, Inc. 
and Yahoo!, transfer pricing and stock option deductions.  Transfer pricing 
is a three-headed beast.  It is generally employed as a base-erosion and 
profit shifting mechanism using goods, I.P., or capital.  The article 
discussed possible solutions to the problem of transfer pricing, and 
suggested international regulation that addresses the principle of arm’s-
length dealing.  However, transfer pricing is the result of different tax 
regimes in the different countries of the world, the direct and inevitable 
result of sovereignty.  While detailed accounting may make it more difficult 
for a corporation to deliberately engage in transfer pricing, heightened 
reporting requirements alone are not likely to resolve the problem.  
Although utopian, the true solution to transfer pricing is the complete 
harmonization of the tax systems of the world.  Until that day, the only real 
solution for the U.S. economy is becoming a more competitive tax 
jurisdiction in a global market arena where tax-havens and black-listed 
nations provide an overly friendly environment to tax-avoiding MNEs. 
On the other hand, stock option deductions are a tax-deferral 
instrument created by a loophole in the legislation.  A nonqualified stock 
option allows the individual to book substantial savings on tax deferral, and 
it allows the corporation to deduct a non-cash expense similar to 
depreciation.  This article seeks to close this tax loophole by applying 
known doctrines of judicial interpretation, as well as proposing amended 
statutory language.  The aim of this article is to strike a balance and treat 
nonqualified stock options like other regular cash compensation in order to 
eliminate the benefits the stock options confer to the holder through tax 
deferral.  This article is far from being the definitive panacea to the ailments 
of the U.S. tax system.  However, this article does illustrate how relatively 
small changes to the wording of relevant I.R.C. and C.F.R. provisions can, 
consistently with legal precedent, resolve or mitigate the problem of 
excessive tax avoidance. 
 
